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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Teheran and Tripoli agreements of 1971 between the oil
exporting countries and the oil companies constituted the first
significant pieces of evidence that a cartel was being operated by the
oil exporting countries. The fact that the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries1 (OPEC) now unilaterally fixes the Drice of oil fur-
ther supports the hypothesis that an economically motivated cartel con-
sisting of the oil exporter countries is dominating the world petroleum/
energy market. Even if the oil companies provide a service for which
there is no institutionalized organizational substitute, they are severe-
ly constrained in their ability to resist producer government initiatives.
The price-making power of OPEC was clearly demonstrated in the fall
of 973 and in 1974. The average price of crude in the Persian Gulf
increased by 505% between October 15, 1973 and November 1, 1974. As
long as the OPEC countries can agree on a joint market strategy they
can take advantage of teir monopoly power and enjoy monopoly profits.
A cartel is, however, an unstable unit even from a theoretic point of
view. The market solution resulting from explicit collusion among oli-
gopolists cannot be uniquely determined. The OPEC countries are also
a rather heterogenous group of countries. To learn about the efficiency
and longevity of cartels, a review was made of the research findings on
the efficiency and the longevity of international cartel agreements.
The economics and political science literature contains more than
50 studies of the operation of cartels in the trade of international com-
modities. Agreements have been formed by companies and countries
IThe members of OPEC are Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Libya, igeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, & Venezuela.
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in commodities as far ranging as tin and tea; these agreements have
lasted for varyin lenaths' of time; and have had varying degrees of
success in curtailing production and raising prices to consuming
countries. The research literature has documented cartel "success" and
has provided a number of reasons why some cartels have worked better
than others. Here we review and compile research results in a way which
should indicate central factors in the operation of workable versus un-
workable cartel agreements.
Although there have been numerous cartels in almost every commo-
dity in international trade, only a small number of these price-control-
ling organizations have been studied in detail. Of those studied, even a
smaller number have been analyzed sufficiently completely to make it
possible to tell the difference between cartel success or failure. We
have found evidence on 51 cartel agreements in 18 industries. These
constitute two samples from which we draw conclusions on the fdctors
determining the success or failure of cartels.
Cartel success or "efficiency" has been defined in terms of the
ability of the organization to raise price at least 200% above the unit
costs of production and distribution. If the cost to the highest cost
member of the cartel at the margin were $1.00 per ton then the cartel
would be efficient if it raised prices to $3.00 per ton and kept them
there for a significant period of time.
The review indicates that of the 51 significant cartel organizations
reported, only 19 achieved price controls which raised the level of
charges to consumers significantly above what they would have been in
the absence of agreements. But even the efficient cartels did not seem
to last very long. Cartels were able to raise prices for four years or
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more, where concentration of production was high, demands inelastic, the
cartel's market share was high, the membership had cost advantages over
outsiders, and governments did not get involved in the operations of the
cartel.
If OPEC were to follow the pattern set by the 19 earlier "efficient"
cartels, then it would likely have a 4 to 6-year duration. The primary
source of breakdown would likely be the uncontrolled additions of supply
from the "fringe" of OPEC countries (Iraq, Indonesia, Nigeria) or from
the non-member countries.
2. CARTEL CHARACTERISTICS
The information available on international cartel agreements is
not sufficient for rigorous empirical hypothesis testing. The
studies made on cartels differ significantly in terms of their level
of detail and research focus. From a theoretic point of view all
important aspects of a cartel agreement were not covered in the studies
that have been reviewed. For the purpose of this study we therefore
constructed two samples out of the 51 cartel agreements on which we had
enough information to judge whether the cartel agreement had been suc-
cessful or not. To identify the most important factors determining the
"efficiency" and longevity of cartel agreements each cartel was sum-
marized along a number of dimensions. Due to the anecdotal and/or vague
nature of the data, we have been limited to a very tight range of response,
often to binary representation. On the cartels belonging to sample 1 we
had sufficient data to describe the cartels along 17 dimensions. Sample
2 consists of cartels on which we had sufficient data Lo code 5 dimensions
only. The dimensions are intended to describe as completely as possible
the known occurrences of cartel formation. The unavailability of infor-
mation on the internal operating mechanisms of these cartels made it im-
possible to include these important aspects of a cartel agreement.
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2.1 Cartel Characteristics of Sample 1
Dimension 1. The concentration of production in the industry is
regarded as being high if the four largest producers in the industry pro-
duce more than 50 percent of the total output of the industry. If this
is the case, the industry gets a score of 1; otherwise, a score of 0 is
assigned.
Dimension 2. The concentration of the international market, the
exports/imports market, is scored in the same way; if the four largest
exporters constitute more than 50 percent of the total market, the
score of this dimension is 1; otherwise it is 0.
Dimension 3. The elasticity of demand is also scored in a binary
way. If the elasticity of demand is more than 1, the score is 1. If the
elasticity of demand is less than 1, that is if the demand is relatively
inelastic, the score is 0. As the time horizon of the cartels is usually
less than the period needed to get a long-term adjustment to prices, it
is the short-term elasticities that are considered relevant.
Dimension 4. The income elasticity is given a value of 1 if demand
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for the commodity is income-elastic, that is if a percentage change in
income implies an even larger percentage change in the demand for the
commodity; otherwise, the valie of 0 is assigned to this dimension.
Dimension 5. If short-term substitutes for a commodity exist, the
value of i is assigned; if no substitutes exist, 0 is assigned to the
commodity.
Dimension 6. The existence of long-term substitutes is treated the
same as for dimension 5.
Dimension 7. If governments were involved in the cartel agreement,
a value of 1 is assigned; otherwise a value of 0 is assigned.
Dimension 8. The length of survival of the formal agreement in years.
Dimension 9. If the cartel members'share of total production in
the industry is above 75 percent, a score of 2 is assigned; if the cartel
members share is between 50 and 75 percent a score of 1 is assigned.
A score of 0 is assigned if the share is below 50 percent.
Dimension 10. If the cartel members are responsible for more than
75 percent of total exports in the international export/import market,
a score of 2 is assigned. A score of 1 indicates that the cartel members
export between 50 and 75 percent of the total; a value of O is assigned if
the cartel members export less than 50 percent of that particular commodity.
Dimension 11. This dimension is included to test whether industries
learn over time, that is if the number of previous attempts to organize
a cartel influence the success of later attempts to organize. The score
is equal to the particular cartel's number in this sequence of attempts.
Dimension 12. Members are given a score of 1 if the cost differences
within the cartel are.less than 50 percent--that is, if the high-cost
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producers produce at a cost no larger than 50 percent above the low-cost
producers. Otherwise, the dimension is given a score of 0.
Dimension 13. The efficiency of the cartel refers to the ability
to charge prices close to the monopoly price, i.e., if price is 200 percent
of marginal cost or more. Otherwise, the score of 0 is assigned. This
very rough indicator of cartel efficiency was applied because information
on the location and slope of the demand curve and the location and slope
of the marginal cost curve usually was not sufficient to allow calculation
of the monopoly price.
Dimension 14. This dimension is given a score of 0 if the cartel
members' potential time horizon is more than 1 year and a score of 1 if
the time horizon is less than 1 year.
Dimens.on 15. The dimension is given the score of 0 if a cartel break-
down was not-market-related, i.e., due to government intervention, war,
etc., and a score of 1 if the breakdown was market-related, i.e., due to
the loss of markets to outsiders or the emergence of competition between
cartel members'.
Dimension 16. This expands on no. 15 by assigning a value of 1 if
the breakdown was market-related and due to external forces, i.e., non-
member suppliers or consumer retaliation, and a value of 0 if the cartel
broke down due to an internal conflict between the cartel members.
Dimension 17. This final measure further expands on the breakdown
issue by assigning a value of 1 if the external forces were outside supply,
i.e., non-member supplies, and a value of 0 if the response of consumers or
demand response constituted the external forces that caused the cartel
breakdown.
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2.2 Cartel Characteristics of Sample 2
This second sample was necessary because we did not have sufficient
information to characterize the cartels along the full set of 17 dimensions
shown above. The attributes of Sample 2, therefore, should be viewed as
a quick summary, and are essentially a subset of the attributes of Sample
1.
Dimension 1. This refers to the length in years of the agreement,
see no. 8 above.
Dimension 2. This attribute is similar but not identical to Dimension
1 of Sample 1 above. If the four-firm concentration ratio is more than
75 percent, a score of 2 is assigned. A is given if between 50 and
75 percent. Concentration of less than 50 percent is designated as 0.
Dimension 3. Here we are referring :o concentration within the cartel
itself. See Dimension 9 of Sample 1 above.
Dimension 4. Cartel breakdown is analyzed as in Dimension 16 in
Sample 1.
Dimension 5. Cartel efficiency is described as in Dimension 13 in
Sample 1.
-9-
3. SAMPLE 1
Sample 1 consists of the industries on which we were able to obtain
information to assign a numerical value to the 17 dimensions defined
above. Ervin Hener's International Cartels and G.W. Stocking and M.'.
Watkins' Cartels in Action are the basic sources of information. In
addition, however, it has been necessary to apply information given by Dr.
James C. Burrows in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Economic
Growth, July 22, 1974, some recent articles on international commodity
markets, as well as our personal judgement. Due to the rather superficial
scanning of the existing cartel literature, as well as the rather inaccurate
state of the data given in this literature, a critical attitude on the
part of the reader is reconmmended. By going through the cartel experience
of various industries, and also explaining the way that we have coded this
experience, we hope to give a feeling for the difficulties involved when
trying to characterize cartels on the basis of such information. The results
are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
1. Natural Rubber
The Stephensun Plan which was sponsored by the British government
was an attempt to regulate the rubber industry. Even though the plan
was a short-term success, it later failed completely. The plan lasted
from 1922 to 1928. The large number of relatively small plantations made
the rubber industry and the rubber trade fairly decentralized. According
to Stocking and Watkins, demand for rubber was inelastic at that time.
There were no substitutes for rubber in the production of tires and tubes.
Synthetic rubber was, however, in the process-of development.
The British colonies contained 72 percent of world capacity in 1922.
The utch colonies contained another 25 percent of world capacity. The
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Dutch twice refused cooperation, but took advantage of the plan by increasing
production. The British market share decreased from 67.5 percent in 1922
to 54.1 percent in 1927, whereas the market share of the Dutch colonies
increased from 23.2 percent to 37.7 percent.
Outside production, internal rivalry, as well as the problems of
timing of restrictions .'ere the reasons for the failure of the Stephenson
Plan.
The International Rubber Regulation Agreement of 1934 did, however,
succeed in increasing prices so that the average producer, according to
Stocking and Watkins, could enjoy a margin of 126 percent, and we judged
the cartel to have been efficient, given the fact that-the cartel lived
with the threat of synthetic rubber.
British, Dutch, French, Indian and Siamese kept the agreement up
until World War II, even though attacked by U.S. protests, which resulted
in the organization of a semi-official resistance movement to conserve tires
and use reclaimed rubber.
The consumption of rubber was assumed to be income-elastic.
2. Tin
Production of tin was dominated by a few governments in the Far
East--Malaysia (Dutch), Thailand, Nigeria and the Belgian Congo. These
producers tried to regulate tin prices, but our recorded attempts, 1929-
1931, 1931-1935, and 1935-1937 were all failures due to lack of discipline
and enforcement of the restrictive measures.
There was no satisfactory substitute for tin, even though there was
some secondary recovery of tin from scrap. Tin was indispensible in
armaments and we assumed that demand was inelastic as is also the case
today, according to C. Fred Bergsten. The statement by Hexner that "production
costs varied from mine to mine" is the basis for our assumption that costs
-13-
differed by mbre than 50 percent.
3. Mercury
According to Hexner and Burrows, the price of mercury has been close
to the monopoly price since 1928. Spain and Italy have completely dominated
the production of tnis comnodity for which no substitute exists. As
mercury is also indispensible in armaments, price-elastic and incore-elastic
demard is assuied.
The cost difference between Spanish and Mexican producers is assumed
to be above 50 percent. The cartel established in 1928 broke down in
1936 due to the Spanish WJar. It was reestablished in 1939 and then lasted
until 1949 when it broke down due to internal problems. Since 1950 there have
never been' more than 3 years of disagreement among the imajor mercury producers
of the world.
4. Aluminum
Originally due to patent rights, and later due to inter-corporatE.
ties, the aluminum industry has been highly concentrated. The sequence
of cartels, 1901-1906, 1906-1908, 1912-1914, 1923-1926, 1926-1930, and
1931-1936, all seem to have been successful in stabilizing the monopoly
level of the previous period.
According to Donald H. Wallace, the elasticity of demand increased
in the latter twenties due to the conversion of latent into effective
demand through the development of new alloys and products. Aluminum
became at this time a capable substitute for various alloys of iron,
copper, and zinc in heavy-duty components. The aluminum industry
was under-going a process of transition from a condition of limited markets
to one of diversified markets. We therefore assumed that demand moved
from the inelastic to the elastic segment of the demand curve in the
late twenties.
-14-
Demand also seems to have been income-elastic in this period.
The importance of technology should imply that cost differences
were small. The capital-intensity of consumption seems to indicate
that no short-term substitutes existed even if long-term substitutes
did exist.
5. Steel
The first international steel cartel, 1926-1930, consisted of
national steel cartels united in an association. The national steel
cartels had government support, but was primarily of a private charcter.
This first cartel produced 30 percent of the world's output of steel
and 66 percent of world exports. It collapsed, however, in 1930 due
to internal problems. In 1930 a second international steel cartel exper-.
ienced half a year of frustration. In 1931 a third cartel lasted for
only two months. A fourth cartel that lasted from 1933 to 1939 had,
according to Stocking and Watkins, some success in keeping prices higher
than otherwise would.have been the case and was also able to discriminate
between customers. The price series does not, however, seem to support
a judgment on the cartel as being efficient.
6. Tea
There have been a number of attempts to organize cartels in the tea
industry. The International Tea Cartel from 1933 to 1939 was regarded
as an interesting example of a collective marketing control established
by trade associations with the cooperation of governments. The concentration
in :the industry was low. Demand was probaoly price inelastic as is the
case today, according to C. Fred Bergsten. Demand also seems to have been
income-elastic in the relevant period. Cost differences were most likely
high. The War prompted the British Ministry of Food to take over the whole
-15-
tea supply and fix prices according to the average price prevailing at the
end of 1938. The price series seem to indicate that the cartel had no effect
on prices.
7. Sugar (1864-1939)
The concentration in the sugar industry is low. In the export markets,
however, the concentration is high due to common sales agencies. According
to Stocking and Watkins, demand was price-inelastic prior to World War II.
Demand seems to have been income-elastic in the same period.
In 1864, 1902-12, 1929, 1942, 1953, 1956 and 1953 cartel attempts
in this industry are included in Sample 2. The first international sugar
cartel -we include in this sample is the so-called Chadbourne Agreement of
1931-1935, which was a private marketing control agreement, approved and
enforced by the respective governments. Failure to restrict production
efficiently and the rapidly increasing market share of outsiders made the
Chadbourne Agreement collapse, On the initiative of the League of Slations,
a new international agreement was signed on May 6, 1937. It was a diplomatic
treaty between 21 governments representing 5-90 percent of the world's sugar
production and consumption. Prices were stabilized some 30 percent above
the 1935-1936 average prices, and the cartel was accordingly judged to be
inefficient. The agreement was disrupted by the War in 1939.
8. Sugar (1958-1961)
Today nearly 90 percent of the world's sugar is either consumed in.the
areas where it is produced or is marketed under a quota system. This
means that a very small proportion of all sugar produced is freely traded
in international markets. In the short-term, corn syrup and other sweeten-
ers can be substituted for cane or beet sugar. The precise elasticity
-16-
of demand is not well known, but it was judged to be inelastic
in the near term.
Sugar trading receives protection from many government-backed commodity
agreements. In the U.S. there is a U.S. Sugar Act. In Great Britian the
comparable pact is the British Commcnwealth Sugar Agreement. In 1958
an International Sugar Agreement (ISA) was negotiated between all of the
large producing nations in order to stabilize the wide fluctuations in
-prices. This international agreement was not able to restrict fluctuations,
but it did serve to prevent any further declines in average prices.
The ISA broke up in 1961 because of growing difficulties between the U.S.
and its major sugar trading partner, Cuba. Until that time the U.S. had
gotten 75 percent of its imports from Cuba. However, in mid-1961 the
U.S. cancelled all international trade with Cuba and sought other sources
of sugar elsewhere in Latin America. At the same time Cuba had huge supplies
which had to be sold in otner, non-U.S. markets. This instability in
market conditions was enough to cause the ISA to crumble and world prices
to :fall. -
9. Copper (1950-1970)
Most of the free world's copper supply is found in fewer than 7
countries and is refined by what is known as "the big eight" firms.
uses in electrical and other industrial processes. Quantitative estimates
of the short-run elasticity of demand (between .21 and .48), have under-
scored that demand is relatively inelastic since not many short-run sub-
stitutes are available. In the long run (10 years or more), alternatives
are. more feasible and demand elasticity is relatively elastic (approximately
2.8). (Burrows, 1974).
-17-
During the mid-1950's, and again in the mid-1960's, producers made
attempts to influence the market price. These actions were generally taken
with tne full knowledge and cooperation of the respective governments.
Chile, Peru, Zambia, and the Congo have been the most active in this regard
and have formed a joint body, CIPEC, to promote their corimon interests.
The initial price experiment (1955-1956) was undertaken by a Zabian producer
who felt tnat he could appreciably affect the rice of copper by imposing
a ceiling on price. Tne unilateral attempt was unsuccessful, however, in
that the cooperation of other producing firms was not attained.
A second price experiment (1964-1966) found more support among the
large producers, and consequently was far more successful from their
perspective. In the two-year period, copper prices doubled as the "big
eight", as well as smaller firms, temporarily agreed on common goals.
After two years of steadily rising prices, agreement among producers faded
as some began shading on prices. Explanations of the breakdown have noted
that some of the less developed countries have vastly different time
horizons than many of the private producers. For example, while Chile was
interested in exploiting a short-run demand in elasticity, many of the
private firms were much more conservatively inclined with an eye toward
preserving long-run demand and discouraging the development of copper
substitutes.
-18-
4. SAMPLE 2
Sample no. 2 consists of the industries on which we were able to
obtain information sufficiently detailed only to codo the five dimensional
cartel table defined aDove. The sources of information are identical to
those of Sample no. 1. The influence of our personal judgment is, however,
more severe on this sample than on the first sample.The results are shown in
Table 3.
1. Wheat
In 1933 the first international heat agreement was established by
governments of wheat-producing and importing countries., ithout direct
reference to private entrepreneurs or their organizations . The agreement
broke down within a year due to disagreement over quotas and acreage re-
duction in addition to a very unfavorable price development. In 1942
Argentina, Australia, England, the U.S. and Canada established a new pool,
limited in scope, but to be extended after the war. This plan collapsed,
however, in 1947 when Argentina abstained.
The post-war international wheat arrangements have been for three-
year periods. The 1949 wheat agreement was renewed in 1953 and 1956,
then revised substantially in 1959 and renewed in 1962, which is the last
year on which we have any inforrmation.Too weak jurisdiction over members
has made tnese agreements inefficient.
2. Copper (1918-1940)
In 1918 a cartel was formed to liquidate the tremendous stocks of
copper piled up as a result of the war and to regulate new production and
exports. It was wholly American in membership. It represented 95 percent
of the American production The only outsider was Katanga, still in its
infancy. The cartel was disbanded in 1924 after dissension arose between
the companies with foreign properties and those with purely domestic.properties.
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The cartel was successful in liquidating stocks without causing a sharp
fall in prices , and also in regulating eports. It was consequently judged
to have been efficient.
In 1926 opper Exporters Inc. (a Webb-Pomerene association) was
established. The company controlled 95 percent of the world's production
of copper. The combined effect of the 1928-29 boom and cartel rationing
sent prices upwards. The resentment against the cartel grew so strong,
however, that a buyer's strike was called. From then until the dissolution
of the cartel in 1932, with the enactment of the U.S. excise tax on copper,
the power position of the cartel steadily declined. On the 1935-1941
international copper cartel information relating to world markets outside
the U.S. is scarce.
3. Platinum
In 1918 several producers tried unsuccessfully to organize a cartel.
In 1931, however, an agreement was signed,only to break down in 1933. Due
to the fact that platinum is mainly a by-product and that palladium w.ilich
is a substitute was not included, control of the market by the cartel
seems to have been impossible.
4. Quebracho
Argentina and Paraguay have cormpletely dominated this industry. In
both countries the quebracho producers were organized in a government-spon-
sored cartel In the periods 1919-1922, 1926-1931, and 1934-1946 (1946
being the last year on which we have information) these two national cartels
operated jointly in the international market through establishing exclusive
sales agencies, export quotas and uniform price policies. In 1942 the Amer-
ican agents were indicted for violation of anti-trust regulations. As we
have not been able to obtain additional information,this indictment (as
well as a 1920-1939 price series) is the basis 6n which we have judged
the cartels to have been efficient.
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5. Sulfur
In 1838 the United Kingdom broke the Sicilian sulfur monopoly by
sending gunboats. In 1934 a cartel was organized among the U.S. and
Italian producers. The U.S. had at that time 80 percent, Italy 11 percent
and Japan 6 percent of the world's production of crude sulfur. The cartel
had complete control over export supplies and markets through the use of
export quotas and uniform prices. According to Hexner, "Significant inter-
national agreements concerning sulfur are most characteristic of modern
cartellization." U.S. anti-trust actions and some information on prices is
the basis for judging the cartel to have been efficient up until World
War II.
6. Sodium Sulpiate (Salt Lake)
Important outsiders seem to have made life difficult for the cartels
in this industry from 1926-1930 and 1930-1939.
7. Potash
Under strong pressure from the French and German governments,the
potash exporters of these two countries formed a cartel in l92fi. Germany
was at that time responsible for about 60 percent and France for about
16 percent of the world's production of potash. Export prices were to be
determined by production costs. American producers were ,however, indicted
in 1939 under the Sherman Act because of alleged cooperation in price policies
among themselves and with the European cartel. It was stated that this
natural monopoly was abused by Germany and France.As export prices of potash
were not published, the above-mentioned evidence is the basis for judging
the cartel to have been efficient.
8. Pnosphate Rock
World phosphate exports were regulated by an agreement established in
1933 and further amplified in 1934 and 1935. The agreement embraced the
whole international market. The agreement is surrounded by a high degree
-23-
Of secrecy. From 1929 to 1939 phosphate prices tend, however, to support
our judgment on the cartel as having been efficient.
9. Magnesite
In 1923 Czechoslovak and Austrian producers established a joint-
stock sales company to regulate the international magnesite market. An
"understanding" with American pruducers was also obtained. The large mag-
nesite consumers were the shareholders of the magnesite companies involved.
In 1941 there was a U.S. Justice Department indictment for U.S.-European
division of world magnesite markets. On this basis we judged the cartel
to have been efficient.
- D1 iamona
Government licencing and monopoly support have helped monopolize the
diamond industry. In 1930 a diamond trading company was established as
the sole selling agency for 99 percent of African diamond production or
95 percent of world diamond production. The British government took over
the company in 19A2, after what is assumed to have been 12 successful years.
11--. Coffee (1957; 1952; 1959-1962)
Coffee is primarily grown in Brazil, other Latin American nations,
and Africa. Since World War II, world production has sharply increased,
while simultaneously Brazil's market share has steadily declined. Production
is almost universally undertaken in the less developed countries and as
such represents a substantial amount of these countries' GNP. Due to
chronic conditions of over supply, especially in Brazil, several exporting
nations have periodically attempted to stabilize or bolster sagging coffee
prices.
In 1957, and again in 1953, there were Latin American Coffee
Agreements that were signed. Most Latin producers agreed to hold back
a percentage of their narvests from tile market with Brazil leading the
charge with a 40 percent reduction. Neither agreement was successful in
...... .A ___ L Ac; .+ .-. lla +ho nan with their nwn coffee.
-24-
In 1959 the African producers agreed to enter an International Coffee
Agreement, in which there was 85 percent participation by world prod-
ucers. The agreement set fixed export quotas which were based on 90
percent of past exports or 88 percent of estimated future exports. The
agreement was renewed annually and was significant in that consuming
nations were also included. The system has had the effect of providing
a floor and increased stability for formerly volatile coffee prices.
-25-
5. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
There are nine efficient and fourteen inefficient cartels in sample 1.
Also, ten efficient and eighteen inefficient agreements make up sample 2.
Therefore, of the 51 significant cartel organizations only 19 achieved price
controls which raised the level of charges to consumers significantly above
what they would have been in the absence of the agreements. The results for
these two samples are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.
The efficient cartels did not seem to last very long. Although formal
organizational agreements (to set up cartel management, for example) lasted
longer in the efficient cartels, the average length of effective controls on
price was not more than four to five years. The mercury cartel in the 1930's
and 1940's, and the potash, magnesite, and diamond cartels of the 1930's,
seem to have been able to control prices for as long as a decade, but these
were not major products in international trade. The more important products,
such as rubber in the 1930's or aluminum, copper or sulfur before World War
II, experienced cartel longevity from one to four years.
There are a number of factors important in the longevity of the
efficient cartel. Without these factors, it would seem to have been impos-
sible for most cartel organizations to last for more than a few months.
1. Concentration of production was characteristic of the efficient
cartel. Approximately 90% of the efficient cartels in sample 1 had con-
centration levels higher than 50% (the largest four firms had more than
50% of total production or capacity to produce); but only 36% of the
inefficient cartels had concentration levels this high. Similarly, the effi-
cient cartels controlled a very high percentage of exports.
2. Demand conditions also strongly affected the chances that the cartel
-26-
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agreement worked well and lasted for a reasonable period of time. The
summary tables show that the efficient cartels were characterized by in-
elastic demands (lack of sensitivity of quantities demanded to price
changes), and that they also were characterized by the lack of short term
substitutes in most cases (only 22%' of the efficient cartels in the first
sample had no long term substitutes); but this was also true of the in-
efficient cartels. The presence of ability to substitute other products
in the long run may have limited both the length of life time and the
efficiency of the agreement.
3. Government involvement made a difference in the success of the agree-
ment. Government agencies were involved in the setting up of the organiza-
tion of the cartel in almost 90% of the cases in which the cartel was not
successful, but in only 42% of the cases in which the cartel did work well.
Although not much information was provided in the studies as to what the
governments' activities were, it is presumed that at some stage political
and diplomatic relations entered into the cartel organizations so as to
break down the agreements.
4. Supply conditions differentiated efficient from inefficient cartels.
Most of the successful cartels had as members one or two firms with pro-
duction costs much lower than other firms, the lowest cost firms tending
to "dominate" operation of the agreements. When cartels did break down,
it was mostly because of entry of additional suppliers or the expansion
of supply by small firms outside the cartels' agreements (as shown by
line 14 of the summary table for sample 1, Table 4).
In summary, there seem to be several important factors differentiating.
-29-
efficient from inefficient cartel agreements.
Cartels were able to raise prices for four years or more, where
concentration of production was high, demands inelastic, and where few
short term substitutes were available for the cartelized product. Gov-
ernments-were involved in breaking down agreements. Operating cost advan-
tages and the presence of few outside sources of supply able to expand
capacity were important for cartel success. These factors are shown in
the summary table for sample 1, as those conditions of the 14 listed, for
which the efficient cartel had significantly different values from the
inefficient cartel.
Much the same is shown by sample 2, because the concentration of
efficient cartels is significantly higher than the inefficient. Also
the cartel members' share of total production was much higher, and if
cartel breakdown occurred, it was mostly because of entry into interna-
tional markets by new firms.
There are further important dimensions not included in the findings
from the earlier research studies. Indications scattered throughout the
studies are that an important additional factor for cartel success or
failure is tight control of distribution channels. The iodine cartel
lasted more than 50 years as an organization without significant disrup-
tion, by making all iodine sales out of a single cartel association office
in London (although there were no findings on the ability of this organi-
lBy "significant difference" we mean a rough qualitative difference in
the magniture of the statistics between 0.0 and 1.0 in the two
columns of the tables. For those six factors termed "sianificant"
thr differences in table values range from .32 to .66. Although there
are smaller differences indicated by other factors, we chose to ignore
them at this time because of small sample size and the highly qualitative
nature of the values assigned between 0 and 1 between each cartel
attribute.
zation to raise unit price above unit cost), There are other examples in
which additional elements of control seem to have followed from cartel su-
pervision of distribution, but these are too scattered to lead to a research
conclusion at this time. Similarly, the factor of the level of concentration
among consumers seems to be important in some cases. Where there are only
a few consumers and they are able to play one cartel member off against the
other, then the efficiency of the cartel would appear to have been limited.
But high buyer concentration was found only in very few cases and cannot
be said to be a "finding" from the research analysis.
Probably the most important determinant of the longevity of a cartel
agreement is the way production and profits are allocated among the cartel
members. The unavailability of information on this aspect of a cartel
agreement made it impossible to determine the level of conflict among the
cartel members. Given the fact that the "efficient" cartel broke down more
often due to the emergence of competition among the members rather than
due to the response of non-members, the internal operating mechanisms of
cartels have to be analyzed if we want to learn more about the stability
of cartel-dominated markets.
The conclusions on important factors for cartels' success, and the
summary tables themselves, are based upon the reading and evaluation of
research materials in a wide variety of industries and cases. There is
a strong element of personal judgment in the assigning of such attributes
as "high concentration" or"lack of short term substitutes." It should be
stressed that another review of this material might well establish somewhat
different factors in the efficiency of agreements, or whether in fact an
agreement was efficient or inefficient. But the overall impression that
efficient cartels do not last very long would probably not be dispelled.
-31-
Neither would the finding that high concentration, the presence of a
dominant producer, and the lack of expansion by those outside the cartel,
contribute very strongly to cartel price control over the 4 to 6-year
lifetime of a typical organization.
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6. IMPLICATIONS FOR OPEC
What do these factors tell us about the causes for the efficiency
and longevity of the present day petroleum cartel? There have been petro-
leum cartels at an earlier time; the "as is" or "Achnacarry" agreement of
the late 1920's to maintain output shares of American oil exporting com-
panies collapsed in i930 without having had a significant effect on Euro-
pean markets. Later similar agreements with quotas and fines did not
collapse, but there is little or no evidence that they had an appreciable
effect on price levels before World War II. From 1945 to 1960 there were
no formal agreements.
But prices were "high" in the sense that marginal production costs
plus user charges could not have exceeded $1.00 per barrel, while prices
were mostly centered around $2.00/barrel. -Since the advent of the
highly efficient OPEC cartel operation in the early 1970's, price-cost
differences have increased to many times those expected from the earlier
cartels.
The present day OPEC agreement has many of the characteristics found
in the earlier cartels that were successful for limited time periods in
other industries. The demands for final product are inelastic, and there
are few short term substitutes for this product. Concentration within the
cartel is substantial, and OPEC itself as an organization supplies about
90% of the total flow in international trade. The Arab subset of OPEC
supplies 54% alone of the total international flow. There are substantial
cost differences among firms, with the Persian Gulf producers having signi-
ficant cost advantages and significantly greater capacity than the "fringe"
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of Southeast Asian, East African and South American countries.
The Teheran and Tripoli agreements in 1971 between the oil exporting
countries and the oil companies may be considered as the first evidence of
an efficient producer country petroleum cartel. Since then the producer
countries have been able to successfully raise prices to a level that makes
OPEC the most efficient cartel in modern times. The OPEC countries have
not, however, been able to agree on and stick to a formal system
for sharing production among the member nations. As long as the OPEC members
accept the way the major oil companies allocate the reductions in production
due to the higher prices and the world recession, the intra-cartel level
of conflicts can be kept at a minimum. The lack of formal production and/or
profits allocation systems, however, makes OPEC as vulnerable to meraence
of internal competition as the cartels that have been reviewed, even if
the willingness to accept production cutbacks and to live with a huge ex-
cess capacity has been impressive.
If OPEC were to follow the pattern set by the 19 earlier "efficient"
organizations, then it would likely have a 4 to 6-year duration. The
primary source of breakdown of price controls would likely be the signi-
ficant additions of supply from either the "fringe" of OPEC members, or the
non-member countries (in this case, the North Sea countries, Canada, and
the United States) which by self-supply reduce the demands placed on the
low cost Persian Gulf states.
-34-
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